Tony Blair said devolution lanced the boil of separatism in Wales

During this critical cabinet meeting, Blair unequivocally rejected proposals to grant full law-making powers to the Welsh Assembly, arguing forcefully that voters in both Wales and Scotland displayed "no appetite" for such extensive additional authority. He contended that the existing devolution settlement had effectively "lanced the boil of separatism," implying that the initial transfer of powers had satisfied nationalist aspirations and solidified the Union. These comments, recorded in the minutes of the 22 July 2004 meeting, underscore the nuanced, and at times contradictory, approach taken by New Labour to constitutional reform in the early 2000s.

The discussion centred on the recommendations of the Richard Commission, a body established to review the powers of the National Assembly for Wales. Chaired by the esteemed Labour peer Lord Ivor Richard, the commission had put forward several far-reaching proposals, most notably advocating for primary law-making powers for the Assembly. This suggestion, however, met with considerable internal resistance, particularly from elements within Welsh Labour itself, highlighting the complex political landscape surrounding devolution at the time.

The cabinet debate in 10 Downing Street was led by Peter Hain, the then-Secretary of State for Wales. Hain presented a more cautious approach, outlining proposals for a significantly more limited extension of powers compared to the Richard Commission’s recommendations. He articulated a key argument against granting full primary law-making powers, stating, "There was no consensus in Wales for radical change. What Wales needed was better administration, not extra powers for the National Assembly." This perspective reflected a common concern that the public was more interested in efficient governance than in abstract constitutional reform, particularly given the relatively low turnout and narrow margin of victory in the 1997 Welsh devolution referendum.

Hain reportedly described his proposals as a "minimalist solution and the least worst available," a pragmatic compromise designed to avert a potentially damaging split among Labour’s supporters in Wales. This delicate balancing act reflected the pressure on the UK government to acknowledge calls for greater Welsh autonomy while simultaneously managing internal party divisions and perceived public apathy towards more radical change. The nuanced position sought to provide some movement on devolution without fully embracing the Richard Commission’s more ambitious vision.

Concluding the cabinet discussion, the minutes meticulously recorded Blair’s summing up of the issue. He affirmed the cabinet’s rejection of the commission’s "more far-reaching proposals" for Wales to make primary legislation. Blair’s rationale was clear and direct: "There was no appetite in Wales for a further referendum on devolution and this provided a brake on such a radical change. Most people, both in Scotland and Wales, were satisfied with the devolution settlement, which had lanced the boil of separatism." This statement encapsulates Blair’s conviction that his government had struck the right balance, believing that the initial transfer of powers had adequately addressed nationalist sentiments without opening the door to further fragmentation of the United Kingdom. The cabinet, according to the records, "took note" of Blair’s emphatic summary, indicating a consensus, or at least an acceptance, of his analysis and direction.

Blair’s journey with devolution began almost immediately upon becoming prime minister in 1997. His New Labour government had made a clear commitment to constitutional reform, including the establishment of a 60-member Welsh Assembly. This new body was tasked with taking over responsibility for a substantial £7bn budget from the UK cabinet’s Welsh Secretary, a significant transfer of administrative power. The National Assembly for Wales officially opened its doors in 1999, marking a new era of governance for the nation.

However, almost from its inception, the debate surrounding the Assembly’s powers was robust and persistent. Questions were continually raised about the sufficiency of the powers it possessed to manage crucial areas such as the National Health Service (NHS), education, and local government. Critics argued that the Assembly’s lack of primary legislative powers rendered it more of an administrative body than a true parliament, limiting its ability to genuinely shape policy and respond to the specific needs of the Welsh people. This ongoing discussion laid the groundwork for future calls for increased autonomy, even as Blair believed the "boil" had been lanced.

The path to full legislative autonomy for Wales was, therefore, not concluded in 2004 but merely paused. Subsequent legislative developments would gradually address the limitations that Blair’s cabinet had chosen to maintain. In March 2006, the Government of Wales Act was passed, a landmark piece of legislation that introduced a significant shift. It allowed the National Assembly to make laws in devolved areas, provided it secured permission through Legislative Competence Orders (LCOs) from both Houses of Parliament in Westminster. Crucially, this 2006 Act also included a provision for the Assembly to gain full law-making powers in devolved areas, but only if this was explicitly backed in a referendum held in Wales. This mechanism provided a clear democratic pathway for greater autonomy, directly addressing the "no appetite" argument by placing the decision directly in the hands of the Welsh electorate.

The opportunity for this decisive public vote arrived in March 2011. Welsh voters were asked whether the Assembly should be able to make laws on all matters in the 20 devolved areas without needing the UK Parliament’s agreement. The outcome decisively contradicted Blair’s 2004 assessment. A clear majority of 63.5% voted in favour of direct Assembly law-making powers, with 36.5% against. While the turnout was 35.4%, relatively modest, the margin of victory was substantial, indicating a discernible public will for greater legislative autonomy. This referendum result effectively dismantled the administrative-only model and ushered in a new era of parliamentary power for Wales, moving it closer to the legislative capabilities enjoyed by the Scottish Parliament. Further devolutionary steps followed, including the Wales Act 2014 and the Wales Act 2017, which cemented the Assembly’s powers, moving to a reserved powers model similar to Scotland’s, where anything not explicitly reserved to Westminster is devolved.

Analysis – Mark Palmer, Wales assistant editor

The release of these cabinet papers provides an invaluable glimpse into a truly significant internal UK Labour government discussion concerning the future of devolution in Wales. It is rare for Welsh issues to command such high-level attention at the very centre of UK government, making these minutes particularly revealing. The debate underscores the inherent complexities and political sensitivities surrounding the devolution project, even years after its initial implementation.

Peter Hain’s role as the then-Welsh Secretary was undeniably challenging. He found himself walking a tightrope, attempting to appease Labour politicians and public sentiment at both ends of the M4 corridor – London and Cardiff. This involved navigating the aspirations of those in Wales who sought greater autonomy, often driven by a desire for distinct Welsh policies, against the more cautious, unionist perspectives prevalent within parts of the UK Labour establishment and public opinion. His "minimalist solution" was a testament to the difficult compromise required to maintain party unity and manage public expectations at the time.

While the compromise reached in 2004 did not grant immediate full law-making powers, it did not entirely rule them out either. As history showed, the pathway to full legislative authority was indeed realised in 2011. This raises a crucial question regarding Tony Blair’s assertion that he had "lanced the boil of separatism." Was he correct in his assessment?

Subsequent events suggest a more nuanced reality. The arguments for independence, both in Wales and Scotland, have not only persisted but have arguably gained significant traction since 2004. Scotland, for instance, held its own independence referendum in 2014, where 44.7% of voters opted to leave the UK, demonstrating a substantial and enduring nationalist sentiment. While the ‘No’ vote prevailed, the debate over Scottish independence remains a live issue, frequently resurfacing in political discourse.

In Wales, too, the landscape has shifted considerably. Plaid Cymru, the Welsh nationalist party, has seen a resurgence in support and is currently vying for the lead in some opinion polls, a stark contrast to their position in 2004. This increased support for a party advocating for greater Welsh autonomy, and ultimately independence, directly challenges Blair’s assertion that the "boil" had been lanced. Instead, it suggests that devolution, rather than extinguishing nationalist aspirations, may have, in some instances, provided a platform from which to articulate and pursue further self-determination.

And another thing that conspicuously hasn’t gone away is the differing views, often fiercely expressed, within the Labour Party itself over the optimal locus of power – whether it should reside primarily in Cardiff Bay or Westminster. This internal struggle reflects the broader tension within the party between its unionist heritage and its commitment to devolution. It highlights the ongoing constitutional evolution of the United Kingdom, where the granting of powers to its constituent nations can sometimes lead to an increased desire for further autonomy, rather than a definitive resolution of separatist tendencies. Blair’s 2004 pronouncements, while reflective of his beliefs at the time, serve as a fascinating historical marker in an ongoing and dynamic constitutional journey.