Europe wrestles with impact of historic regional gains for Germany’s AfD.

The words "seismic," "a socio-political earthquake," and "a watershed moment for Germany" reverberated through political analysis and media coverage following the stunning local election victory of the anti-immigration Alternative for Germany (AfD) party. While the scale of these pronouncements might seem hyperbolic, particularly given that Saxony-Anhalt, one of Germany’s sixteen regions with just 1.7 million of the nation’s 59 million eligible voters, narrowly failed to grant the AfD an outright majority, the significance of this outcome is undeniably profound, both within Germany and across the continent.

Domestically, the regional landslide places immense pressure on Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s beleaguered centrist coalition government in Berlin. Merz’s promise to curb the AfD’s popularity now appears deeply compromised, potentially marking a turning point in his political career. This internal turmoil further weakens and distracts Germany, the European Union’s economic powerhouse, at a critical juncture. The continent is already grappling with the multifaceted challenges of Russian aggression, the unpredictable trade policies of Donald Trump, and the escalating economic competition with China.

The Saxony-Anhalt result also compels a deep and uncomfortable introspection within Germany itself, a nation still profoundly shaped by its Nazi past. This represents the first significant electoral triumph for a hard-right nationalist party since the fall of the Third Reich in 1945. German authorities have increasingly labeled the AfD as anti-democratic, with several regional branches, including that in Saxony-Anhalt, being designated as far-right extremist by intelligence agencies. While the AfD has historically found strong support in eastern Germany, current polling indicates it has emerged as the leading political party nationwide, suggesting a broader societal shift. This phenomenon raises critical questions about the German political mainstream’s perceived failure to adequately address the concerns of its electorate. What will Europe’s largest economy and most populous nation, excluding Russia, do to navigate this evolving political landscape?

The ripples from Saxony-Anhalt are extending far beyond Germany’s borders. Notably, the President of the United States, Donald Trump, was quick to amplify the exit poll results on his Truth Social platform. The AfD’s core messaging – characterized by its anti-immigration stance, opposition to "woke" culture, and the slogan "Germany for Germans" – resonates strongly with Trump’s "Make America Great Again" narrative. Like many other nationalist parties across Europe, the AfD appears to draw heavily from the Trump playbook, employing tactics such as undermining mainstream media, questioning judicial impartiality, and promising a return to national greatness. It is noteworthy, however, that Trump is seldom explicitly mentioned on European campaign trails, a testament to his often-negative perception among voters.

Following Trump’s social media activity, Kirill Dmitriev, the influential CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund, also weighed in, hailing the AfD’s victory as "historic." He declared the German national government "discredited" and the German Chancellor "humiliated," drawing a parallel between Merz and the former UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, who recently resigned. Russia’s keen interest in these German regional elections, and Dmitriev’s jab at the UK, are rooted in geopolitical realities. Germany, as the largest single financial donor to Ukraine, and the UK, a significant provider of missiles used to strike Russian territory, have both incurred Moscow’s deep displeasure. The AfD, in stark contrast, adopts a decidedly pro-Russia stance. The party advocates for the cessation of military aid to Ukraine, the lifting of sanctions against Moscow, and a resumption of energy imports from Russia. Germany’s energy-intensive industries, in particular, suffered a severe economic blow following the suspension of Russian energy imports after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

The AfD’s more conciliatory approach towards Russia holds particular appeal in eastern Germany, which continues to lag economically behind the western regions, despite Germany’s substantial investment of between 2.3 and 3 trillion euros (depending on inflation adjustments) in integrating the former communist territories after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Saxony-Anhalt, as Germany’s poorest region, exemplifies this economic disparity. Here, as in much of eastern Germany, voters often express "Ostalgie," a form of nostalgia for the perceived stability of the communist era.

The European Union is also closely monitoring the implications of the Saxony-Anhalt election. The next twelve months promise a packed election schedule across key EU member states, including France, Italy, Spain, and Poland. Brussels harbors concerns that a broader surge in support for "extreme" parties, particularly on the right of the political spectrum, could materialize across the continent. Santiago Abascal, the leader of Spain’s nationalist Vox party, expressed optimism on X, calling the AfD’s victory in Saxony-Anhalt "a great hope for Germany and for Europe." Conversely, France’s Europe Minister, Benjamin Haddad, an ally of President Emmanuel Macron, issued a stark warning: "this is a serious moment in Europe, seeing the far right win in a regional election in Germany."

It is important to note that the AfD, and other parties categorized as "extreme right" or "hard right," reject these labels. Their party programs and tones can vary significantly; for instance, Marine Le Pen’s National Rally in France expelled the AfD from its European Parliament grouping two years ago, citing its "radical" positions. However, a shared platform of anti-immigration sentiment and strong nationalist rhetoric binds these parties, a development that deeply worries the EU. Whether the slogans are "Germany First," "Italy First," or "France for the French!," the underlying concern in Brussels is that the rise of nationalist parties erodes European cohesion at a time when external challenges demand unprecedented unity.

Parties like the AfD and Italy’s League Party are often characterized by their Euroscepticism. Yet, Brussels argues that a united Europe is essential to counter aggressive trade practices by the United States, such as tariffs, and to effectively protect European businesses from what is perceived as China’s "goods dumping." The European defense establishment also warns that any fracturing of sanctions against Russia, or a weakening of commitment to NATO membership – as suggested by parties like France’s National Rally or Germany’s AfD – emboldens Moscow. Security officials emphasize that maintaining solidarity is crucial to containing Russia in Ukraine, thereby preventing any temptation for the Kremlin to test NATO defenses, particularly in the Baltic states.

European voters are acutely aware of these external threats and their domestic repercussions. They express anxiety about the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, the strain on domestic healthcare services, and the dwindling economic security for themselves and their families. Uncontrolled immigration and public safety are also significant concerns. This confluence of anxieties underscores the profound significance of the Saxony-Anhalt vote, serving as a flashing red warning to traditional political parties and to European institutions, including the judiciary and security services, which the AfD often dismisses as a self-serving "Establishment."

Citizens across the continent feel disenfranchised and let down by parties they have consistently supported for decades. Their turn towards parties on the right does not necessarily signify a wholesale embrace of extremism. The AfD’s campaign slogan in Saxony-Anhalt, "Anything is Possible!", coupled with a promise to restore national pride, appears to have resonated with a populace increasingly willing to consider untried and untested political alternatives. The challenge now for Germany and for Europe is to understand and address the underlying grievances that fuel this sentiment, lest the pursuit of "Germany First" or similar nationalistic agendas undermine the very foundations of European cooperation and security.